NEW LIES FOR OLD The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation ANATOLIY GOLITSYN TO THE MEMORY OF Anna Akhmatova CONSCIENCE. Throughout KGB defector Major Anatoliy Golitsyn’s second book Under Golitsyn’s original understanding, as presented in New Lies for Old. New Lies for Old- The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation has 40 ratings and 4 reviews. Steve said: Written Anatoliy Golitsyn. · Rating.

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The Advantages of Apparent Disunity Communists regard unity between the Western powers as inherently unstable; it follows from the nature of the capitalist system that, in normal circumstances, divisive considerations of national interest outweigh tendencies toward solidarity and cohesion. After the collapse, however, is a different story.

Anatoliy Golitsyn

It could be seen in the following: Lee Edwardsen rated it really liked it May 26, By November Soviet influence in the area was strong enough for the “independent” DVR to be openly incorporated into the Soviet Union as its Far Eastern region kray. This book is primarily concerned with the communist use of strategic disinformation. The leaders of all eighty-one parties committed themselves to the program set out in the conference’s statement, or — as it is sometimes described — Manifesto.

Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Since in the last years of Stalin’s life there was an acute crisis in Soviet affairs and a lack of any coherent policy for resolving it, the special operations of Service 5 were limited in scope to unattributable propaganda operations gklitsyn to conceal the crisis and to justify some of the more outrageous and irrational instances of Stalin’s behavior.

Its role is determined by the particular ways in which communist regimes respond anatopiy crises within their systems, by the unlimited extent of communist external objectives, and by the communist capacity for executing a worldwide, long-term, offensive political strategy.

Anatoliy Golitsyn – Wikipedia

Not normal, however, if the USSR had collapsed. These are some extracts: They were nationalists at heart, and their regime was evolving into a moderate, national regime and might soon collapse. The term means a systematic effort to disseminate false information and to distort or withhold information so as to misrepresent the real situation in, and policies of, the communist world and thereby to confuse, deceive, and influence the noncommunist world, to jeopardize its policies, and to induce Western adversaries to contribute unwittingly to the achievement of communist objectives.


Although it was a failure, it was known to Stahn’s immediate heirs in the Soviet leadership. It was unanimously decided to make changes in Stalinist practices in the party and administration, although without public criticism of Stalin.

For example, the Soviet security service used to practice a provocation technique through which any well-wisher who attempted to estabHsh contact by telephone with the American or British embassies in Moscow would be connected with specially trained officials of the security service.

On Khrushchev’s order the special troops were put on the streets, with orders to fire on the crowds.

Nw coincided in time with Shele-pin’s report and the intensive preparation of a program of political disinformation operations. If these general difficulties were the only ones. The manner of solving such a crisis in a communist system is normally arbitrary and authoritarian.

It threatened their own position. Apart from traditional historical studies of prerevolutionary Russia and China, new specialities have been invented, such as “Sovietology” or the more limited “Kremlinol-ogy,” which study the policy-making level in the Soviet Union.

With the help of the army and the security service, Khrushchev defeated ggolitsyn “antiparty group” by the narrowest of margins.

For example, former communist party members of all ranks who had suffered repression under Stalin, or their widows and families, could be brought into active collaboration with the regime in the implementation of a Leninist policy that ostensibly repudiated Stalinism. One was pld study on the use of KGB agents of influence in anatpliy Soviet intelhgentsia meaning in this context scientists, academics, writers, musicians, artists, actors, stage and screen directors, and rehgious leaders ; the other was on the disclosure of state secrets in the interests of policy.

The scope and scale of disinformation activity by communist regimes is virtually unlimited. Direct attempts were made to exert political influence abroad.

As communists they wanted to stabilize the system, and they viewed with dismay Khrushchev’s establishment of his own cult of personality. These would pose as members of the American or British embassy staffs and would arrange to meet the well-wisher outside the embassy, with predictable consequences for the leis concerned.


Given total control over the communications media, communist governments need have no fear of adverse publicity; they can say one thing in public and do the opposite in private with complete impunity. Investigative reporting of the type so popular in the West is impossible in communist countries without at least tacit cooperation from the security authorities.

Another was to establish contacts with foreign statesmen and other ood figures, either in their home countries or during their visits to the Soviet Union, and use them to influence Western governments. All techniques have their individual limitations. InAnatoliy Golitsyn and Christopher Story published a book entitled The Anatoly Deception [19] containing purported memoranda attributed to Golitsyn claiming:.

To this end, all ministries of the Soviet Union and all first secretaries of republican and provincial party organizations were to be acquainted with the new political tasks of the KGB to enable them to give support and help when needed.


All of them realized that only agreement on a long-range policy would preclude recurrent power struggles and give stability to the leadership. Colleen Rankin rated it liked it Jan 23, New Lies for Old: Between and genuine, improvised de-Stalinization was used to correct mistakes and improve the Soviet regime. However “the development did not come to fruition,” according to the KGB file records.

Their new loyalty to the Soviet regime was not in doubt, for they had betrayed their former friends in the anticommunist underground.

The official ones are: For the first year he worked against Russian emigres, and for the second against British intelligence. Gribanov also instructed members of his staff, posing as senior officials of various Soviet government departments, to establish personal contact with, and exercise political influence over, the ambassadors in Moscow of all the developing countries.