Mind-Body Relationship | kinenbicounter.info
Health Psychology Mind-Body Relationship From earliest times – mind and body generally thought of as one unit Disease understood as resulting from some. According to Descartes, these realms are forever separate such that the mind and body cannot influence one another. The mind works. Most of the previous accounts of the relationship between mind and body had psychologists generally agree that consciousness (the mind) is the function of.
Clearly, a good deal rides on a satisfactory solution to the problem of mental causation [and] there is more than one way in which puzzles about the mind's "causal relevance" to behavior and to the physical world more generally can arise. According to Descartes, minds and bodies are distinct kinds of "substance". Bodies, he held, are spatially extended substances, incapable of feeling or thought; minds, in contrast, are unextended, thinking, feeling substances.
If minds and bodies are radically different kinds of substance, however, it is not easy to see how they "could" causally interact. Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia puts it forcefully to him in a letter: For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body's being propelled—to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing's surface.
Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the impelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing's being immaterial Elizabeth is expressing the prevailing mechanistic view as to how causation of bodies works.
Causal relations countenanced by contemporary physics can take several forms, not all of which are of the push—pull variety. Freemansuggests that explaining mind—body interaction in terms of "circular causation" is more relevant than linear causation. Many suggest that neuroscience will ultimately explain consciousness: Abstract information processing models are no longer accepted as satisfactory accounts of the human mind.
Interest has shifted to interactions between the material human body and its surroundings and to the way in which such interactions shape the mind.
Proponents of this approach have expressed the hope that it will ultimately dissolve the Cartesian divide between the immaterial mind and the material existence of human beings Damasio, ; Gallagher, A topic that seems particularly promising for providing a bridge across the mind—body cleavage is the study of bodily actions, which are neither reflexive reactions to external stimuli nor indications of mental states, which have only arbitrary relationships to the motor features of the action e.
The shape, timing, and effects of such actions are inseparable from their meaning. One might say that they are loaded with mental content, which cannot be appreciated other than by studying their material features. Imitation, communicative gesturing, and tool use are examples of these kinds of actions. Neural correlates of consciousness The neuronal correlates of consciousness constitute the smallest set of neural events and structures sufficient for a given conscious percept or explicit memory.
Mind Body Debate | Simply Psychology
This case involves synchronized action potentials in neocortical pyramidal neurons. Neurobiology and Neurophilosophy A science of consciousness must explain the exact relationship between subjective conscious mental states and brain states formed by electrochemical interactions in the body, the so-called hard problem of consciousness.
Neurophilosophy is the interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. One of the key features of some of these psychotherapies e. Thus, in contrast to standard cognitive and behavioral therapies, one of the aims of mindfulness-based psychotherapies is to increase awareness of the body.
Awareness is not about cognition but more about feeling; and the body is seen as the reference point for awareness.
Mind–body problem - Wikipedia
Thus changes in cognitions e. It is difficult to articulate the relationship between mind and body implied by mindfulness-based psychotherapies due to two reasons.
These questions illustrate some of the issues which arise when dualistic thinking is reflected upon carefully. In practice, BP primarily works on releasing and re-shaping somatic memories in order to release associated psychological constraints Totton, The practice of BP implies a very close relationship between body and mind, to the point that they are seemingly undifferentiated during therapy. BP has been described as being fundamentally underpinned by an explicit theory of mind—body functioning which assumes a functional unity between body and mind in which there is no separation or hierarchical relationship between the two www.
SUMMARY This brief review exposes a lack of consensus, both implicit and explicit, regarding the mind—body relationship across psychotherapeutic approaches. It is our position that psychotherapeutic research and practice would benefit from an organizing framework for the mind—body relationship, which could be applied across all psychotherapies.
Recent research in philosophy Clark, ; Lakoff and Johnson,cognitive science Brooks, ; Chemero, and psychology itself Barsalou, ; Glenberg and Robertson, suggests that this framework should be underpinned by a holistic conceptualization of the mind—body relationship.
Embodied cognition offers a psychological framework underpinned by a holistic conceptualisation of the mind—body relationship. Some of the abovementioned psychotherapies which have implied a holistic mind—body perspective have already started to draw on embodied cognition and related ideas. For example, Totton has recently highlighted the utility of drawing on embodiment from a social perspective to enhance the practice of body psychotherapy, while Michalak et al.
Before describing the psychological framework of embodied cognition, it is important to briefly examine its philosophical underpinnings which form the foundation for its conceptualisation of a holistic mind—body relationship, from both phenomenological and objective perspectives. The subject-body can be considered the body experienced from a first-person perspective which acts on the world, whereas the object-body can be considered the body as an object of the world experienced from a third-person perspective.
American pragmatism offers an objective, philosophical account of a holistic mind and body in the form of naturalism Johnson, As Horst explicates, there have been various definitions and strands of naturalism.
The account we refer to in this section aligns with the Darwinian paradigm and, more specifically with physicalism, emergence, and supervenience Harbecke, ; Montero, ; McLaughlin and Bennett, This form of naturalism is committed to an account in which all things in the world, including body and mind are natural or naturally emergent Horst, ; Aikin, In turn, it posits that all explanation should be causal and reducible to natural explanations and is consequently committed to the study of the person as an object and the natural evolution of all human functions Aikin, ; Johnson, The principle of continuity posits that there is no break in experience between the processes of perceiving, feeling, moving, and thinking; instead they are levels of organic functioning from which higher function emerges.
It describes three levels of organization: The principle explains the progression from the physical level to the level of the mind without introducing new ontological entities, structures, or forces. Dewey argues that new organization is the reason that organisms with minds can do things which psycho-physical entities cannot do, and why psycho-physical entities can do things which physical entities cannot do. As Aikinp. Thus, phenomenology and naturalism are contrasting, but complementary approaches Aikin, ; Zahavi, Thus, a philosophical integration of these perspectives may be possible Zahavi,but our aim here is to provide a framework for psychotherapeutic research and practice.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide a psychological account which integrates subjective and objective perspectives of a holistic mind—body relationship. We propose that grounded cognition provides such a framework. Grounded cognition has been comprehensively articulated and critiqued in the literature Barsalou, has a strong empirical foundation e. Thus, each according to their bodily experiences with morels forms different conceptualizations of it. However, these concepts are not determinate: Furthermore, it is important to note that there is nothing stopping Sally, Charles, and Lucy from having the same concept for a morel, it is simply their differing bodily interactions with the morel which has determined their conceptualizations.
Finally, it can be assumed that they have the same visual conceptualization of a morel; they all know one when they see it. However, if Lucy were to have been born blind, she would never be able to obtain the same concept of a morel as Sally and Charles. In sum, grounded cognition implies that cognition is emergent from and inextricably tied to the subjective, lived, experience of the body-in-the-world.
Conceiving of the relationship between body and mind from this holistic, psychological perspective can be expected to have a number of important implications for psychotherapy theory and practice. When the mind—body relationship is conceptualized from a dualist or exclusivist perspective, a tension is created between the phenomenological needs of the patient who is present mind and body and the emphasis on either mind or body according to the theoretical assumptions of the psychotherapy practiced by the therapist.
One example of this is the de-emphasis of the body during the practice of psychotherapies whose underlying theory disembodies the mind.
During such therapies e. Second, a psychologically articulated, holistic framework for the mind—body relationship encourages theoretical reflection about this relationship by challenging dualist and exclusivist assumptions inherent in some psychotherapies. In turn, this helps to clarify some of the points of difference between the psychotherapies described above.
An example of this is traditional behavioral therapy and body psychotherapy. Both emphasize the body and conceptualize it as the agent of change and as a consequence, both prioritize the body in therapy. One of the primary differences between the two can be ascertained by reflecting on the mind—body relationship.
Traditional behavior therapy is very much exclusivist, dismissing the mind and cognition and emphasizing the body and behavior, both methodologically and theoretically. Contrastingly, body psychotherapy recognizes cognitions whilst treating them via the body, thus implying a holistic conceptualization of mind and body.
Third, a holistic conceptualization of the mind—body relationship has the potential to further de-stigmatize mental illness Thomas, ; Ungar and Knaak, ab. Ungar and Knaak a suggest that dismissive and blaming attitudes toward mental health issues can be attributed to the absence of an organic explanation for most mental health issues.
Thomas suggests that promoting mental illness to non-psychiatric health professionals as an interaction between cognitive, behavioral, emotional, biological, and environmental factors would reduce dualistic thinking around mental health issues and help with de-stigmatization in these settings. Thus, we propose that the holistic conceptualization of the mind—body relationship presented here will further help with de-stigmatization of mental illness in non-psychiatric settings.
Fourth, the clearly articulated, explicit position of a holistic mind—body portrayed by grounded cognition encourages a more reflective approach to the issue in practice. Theories underlying most current psychotherapies do not explicitly state their position regarding the relationship between mind and body.
Consequently, practitioners unreflectively adopt the assumptions inherent in the psychotherapies they utilize. The clear articulation of a holistic mind—body from both phenomenological and objective perspectives may assist practitioners to reflect on this relationship. The issue for psychotherapy practice is that in using these labels with patients, they automatically divide psychopathologies into arbitrary categories and thus portray dualist or exclusivist agendas.
This is but one example of changes which may come of reflecting on the mind—body relationship in practice.
Mind-Body Health Connection
Finally, a new perspective on the mind—body relationship will guide the identification of gaps in existing therapies and consequently promote an expansion of the range of therapies offered to the patient.
For example, grounded cognition implies that one way to change cognitions is through the subjective, lived, bodily experience of the individual. Encouraging practitioners to reflect on a holistic mind—body approach may result in a wider range of therapies they can offer their patients stemming from this idea. Further development of these ideas may also result in the creation of new and innovative therapeutic methods to augment those already in existence. By reviewing how mind and body are traditionally understood in major psychotherapies, we have attempted to underscore some of the tensions in this area.
By introducing and outlining grounded cognition as a holistic psychological approach consistent with both radically subjectivist Merleau-Ponty and objectivist Dewey philosophical approaches, we hope to have proposed a new way forward for theorists and practitioners of psychotherapy. This new way forward throws light on the relationship between existing psychotherapies, the relationship between theory and practice, and highlights opportunities for new approaches to psychotherapy.
Conflict of Interest Statement The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Pragmatism, naturalism, and phenomenology. Clinical, Experimental, and Theoretical Aspects. Thomson — Borrett D. Bridging embodied cognition and brain function: The healthy quality of mindful breathing: How extending your middle finger affects your perception of others: Learned movements influence concept accessibility.
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