effect of central bank independence (CBI) on inflation. studies have successfully identified a negative relationship between CBI and inflation. . In this section, we describe the value, progress, and diversity of central bank reforms in CEE. endorsed by the data since the link between inflation and unemployment persistence is government delegates monetary policy to an independent central bank with . rate in each period (n"nz) to minimise the value of its loss function, where. There is a widespread agreement among central bankers around the world who stipulates that in the fiat money regime the mission of keeping stable the value.
They mature in, and The estimates of average levels of inflation expected to prevail over the duration of each gilt pair are plotted in Figure 1with the May 6 event date and the traditional two-week event window highlighted.
It can be seen that expected inflation decreased on the event date and indeed over the entire two-week event window. Moreover, these decreases were seen for all three maturities in the study.
In contrast, estimates of changes in expected future real interest rate levels not shown here were extremely minor. A case study Since the regime change is a unique event, we conduct a case study by comparing observed changes over the event window to a day pre-event estimation period. I examine three different event periods: The longer-term windows allow for information concerning the regime change which the market acquired with leads and lags relevant to the event date.
For one-day and two-day event windows, the results were strongest for the longest maturity bondswhose estimate of average inflation declined from 3. Moreover, this represented a ten standard deviation movement relative to changes in expected inflation observed over the estimation period. While this is by no means a formal hypothesis test, it appears quite unlikely that the movement in this series was random noise. The movements in expected inflation for the shorter maturity bonds were more moderate.
Expected inflation for the bonds declined from 3. The shortest-term bonds exhibited declines in expected inflation from 3. Despite their relatively more moderate response, these movements were also over two standard deviations as estimated from the estimation period. The two-week event window examines movements from April 28 through May 13, one week before and after the May 6 announcement.
In this case, the movement in expected inflation levels is even larger. Expected inflation declines by 60 basis points for the bond pair and by 55 basis points for the bond pair.
Central Bank Independence
These movements are greater than five standard errors for two-week window movements over the estimation period. The bond pair declines by a more moderate 39 basis points. Conclusion These results indicate that the market perceived that enhanced central bank independence would lead to lower average rates of future inflation. For the longest-maturity bond pairaverage future expected inflation rates decreased by 34 basis points on the day of the announcement and decreased by 60 basis points over the longer two-week event window.
Moverover, these results are not subject to the criticisms that a spurious negative relationship exists between central bank independence and inflation because countries that desire lower inflation rates are also likely to adopt more independent central bank regimes.
In this case, it is unlikely that the attitude of the British public towards inflation changed markedly on May 6. These results, therefore, provide evidence that announcements of institutional changes alone do matter, in the sense that the market priced this institutional change as having a significant impact on future expected inflation rates. Spiegel References Cukierman, Alex.
Central Bank Strategies, Credibility and Independence. Evidence from British Index-Linked Gilts. This publication is edited by Sam Zuckerman and Anita Todd. Permission to reprint must be obtained in writing. The current de facto independence of those banks could be undermined and quite quickly at that.
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Why was the issue important enough to warrant a major article in a major business newspaper? Why, when left to their own devices, are central bankers tougher on inflation than governments, politicians, or the general populace?
Partly because they represent bank, business, and creditor interests, all of which are hurt if prices rise quickly and unexpectedly.
We learned in Chapter 9 "Bank Management" that banks are naturally uncomfortable in rising interest rate environments, and in Chapter 4 "Interest Rates"we saw that inflation invariably brings with it higher rates.
Net creditors—economic entities that are owed more than they owe—also dislike inflation because it erodes the real value of the money owed them. Finally, businesses tend to dislike inflation because it increases uncertainty and makes long-term planning difficult. Central bankers also know the damage that inflation can do to an economy, so a public interest motivation drives them as well. People and the politicians they elect to office, on the other hand, often desire inflation.
Many households are net debtors, meaning that they owe more money than is owed to them.
Inflation, they know, will decrease the real burden of their debts. Politicians know this, too, so they tend to err on the side of higher rather than lower inflation. Politicians also know that monetary stimulus—increasing the money supply at a faster rate than usual or lowering the interest rate—can stimulate a short burst of economic growth that will make people happy with the status quo and ready to return incumbents to office.
If inflation ensues and the economy turns sour for awhile after the election, that is okay because matters will likely sort out before the next election, when politicians will be again inclined to pump out money. This is called the political business cycle.
Politicians might also want to print money simply to avoid raising direct taxes. The resultant inflation acts like a tax on cash balances which lose value each day and blame can be cast on the central bankers.
Would you want the armed forces run by majority vote? Have you heard about the tyranny of the majority? Central bank independence is not just about inflation but about how well the overall economy performs. There is no indication that the inflation fighting done by independent central banks in any way harms economic growth or employment in the long run.
Keeping the lid on inflation, which can seriously injure national economies, is therefore a very good policy indeed.
Another knock against independent central banks is that they are not very transparent.
The Fed, for example, has long been infamous for its secrecy. When forced by law to disclose more information about its actions sooner, it turned to obfuscation.
For all its unclear language, the Fed is more open than the ECB, which will not make the minutes of its policy meetings public until twenty years after they take place. It is less transparent, however, than many central banks that publish their economic forecasts and inflation rate targets.
- British Central Bank Independence and Inflation Expectations
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As we will see in Chapter 26 "Rational Expectations Redux: Monetary Policy Implications"theory suggests that central banks should be transparent when trying to stop inflation but opaque when trying to stimulate the economy.